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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 04456

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PGOV US GE GW WB FR UK
SUBJECT: FRG CHANCELLERY BRIEFING ON BERLIN AND INNER-
GERMAN RELATIONS

REFS: (A) USBER 701; (B) BONN 3115

BEGIN SUMMARY. IN PREPARATION FOR A REOPENING OF
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GDR, THE FRG IS CURRENTLY
EXAMINING A LONG LIST OF PROJECTS AND ISSUES ON WHICH
AGREEMENT WOULD BE DESIRABLE. WISCHNEWSKI WENT OVER THE
LIST WITH THE THREE ALLIED AMBASSADORS IN A MARCH 10
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MEETING AT THE CHANCELLERY WHICH HE SAID HE HOPED WAS
ONLY THE FIRST OF SEVERAL SUCH CONSULTATIVE SESSIONS.
WISCHNEWSKI BRIEFED THE AMBASSADORS ON THE MARCH 7
MEETING OF THE CHANCELLOR AND OTHER TOP OFFICIALS
(PROVIDING SOME INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTING THAT WHICH
USBER REPORTED IN REF A) AND STATED THAT THE NEXT SUCH
MEETING WOULD AIM AT REACHING DECISIONS AS TO WHICH

BERLIN AND INNER-GERMAN PROBLEMS SEEMED SUSCEPTIBLE OF SOLUTION AND AT WHAT COST TO THE FRG. THOSE ITEMS WOULD THEN BE COMBINED INTO A PACKAGE WHICH GAUS WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO TRY OUT ON THE GDR. ON THE BASIS OF "CONTACTS" WITH THE GDR LEADERSHIP, WISCHNEWSKI BELIEVES THAT THE GDR IS ALSO INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. MINISTER OF STATE WISCHNEWSKI MET WITH THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS IN THE CHANCELLERY ON MARCH 10 FOR A 90-MINUTE BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION ON BERLIN AND INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. BONN GROUP REPS FROM THE THREE EMBASSIES AND ALSO FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE WERE PRESENT, ALONG WITH TWO CHANCELLERY AIDES.

2. THE MEETING WAS ARRANGED AT WISCHNEWSKI'S INITIATIVE, ALTHOUGH IT UNDOUBTEDLY WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE RECENT SUGGESTION MADE BY THE FRENCH IN THE BONN GROUP THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS BE RESUMED. THE THREE AMBASSADORS HAD INTENDED TO REITERATE THE FRENCH SUGGESTION AT THE LAST QUADRIPARTITE LUNCHEON, BUT STATE SECRETARY GEHLHOFF INDICATED ON THAT OCCASION THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD ALREADY RECOMMENDED THAT THE CHANCELLERY ARRANGE AN EARLY BRIEFING OF THE THREE AMBASSADORS.

3. WISCHNEWSKI WAS CORDIAL AND RELAXED AND GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF FRANKNESS IN HIS BRIEFING AND IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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THIS WOULD BE ONLY ONE OF MANY SUCH SESSIONS.

RECENT GDR ACTIONS

4. BEFORE DISCUSSING THE MARCH 7 MEETING OF THE CHANCELLOR AND KEY MINISTERS ON INNER-GERMAN POLICY, WISCHNEWSKI COMMENTED ON THE RECENT GDR ACTIONS WHICH HAD HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH THE FRG:

-- A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF LATE IN THE NUMBER OF TURNBACKS OF WOULD-BE VISITORS TO EAST BERLIN AND THE GDR. ANALYSIS HAD SHOWN THAT MOST CASES FELL IN ONE OF TWO CATEGORIES: FORMER GDR RESIDENTS WHO HAD EMIGRATED THROUGH NORMAL PROCEDURES, AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES -- E.G., THOSE WITH CLOSE RELATIVES OR FINANCEES IN THE GDR. THE FRG HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE RESTRICTIONS ON ENTRY WERE AMONG MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GDR TO TRY TO LESSEN THE DESIRE OF EAST GERMANS TO EMIGRATE.

-- A REFUSAL BY THE GDR, SINCE JANUARY, TO ACCEPT
INQUIRIES FROM THE FRG PERMANENT MISSION CONCERNING
PERSONS WHO HAD APPLIED FOR PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE.

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SUCH INQUIRY PROCEDURES HAD BEEN FOLLOWED FOR TWO AND
A HALF YEARS; NOW THE GDR TERMS THEM INTERFERENCE IN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

-- CONTROLS ON VISITORS TO THE FRG PERMANENT
REPRESENTATION IN EAST BERLIN. THESE CONTROLS BEGAN
APPROXIMATELY IN NOVEMBER, WHEN VISITORS WERE STOPPED
AFTER THEY HAD LEFT THE FRG MISSION AND ASKED FOR
IDENTIFICATION. IN MOST INSTANCES NOTHING WAS WRITTEN

DOWN BY THE POLICE. THE MEASURES AIMED AT PREVENTING
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ENTRY INTO THE MISSION WHICH WERE INSTITUTED ON
JANUARY 11 FORTUNATELY ENDED AFTER ONE DAY. NOW,
ALTHOUGH THE POST-CONTROLS ARE STILL IN EFFECT, THE
NUMBER OF VISITORS HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL (50 TO 60
DAILY). MEANWHILE, THE FRG HAS TAKEN THIS OPPORTUNITY
ONCE MORE TO CHECK VERY CAREFULLY THE PROCEDURES
FOLLOWED IN THE FRG MISSION, TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THERE
ARE NO GROUNDS FOR ACCUSATIONS OF INTERFERENCE IN GDR
INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WISCHNEWSKI SAID HE WAS CONVINCED
THAT THE EMPLOYEES OF THE MISSION ARE VERY CORRECT
IN THIS REGARD.

-- THE RECENT GDR MEASURES AFFECTING THE SPECIAL
STATUS OF BERLIN: IMPOSITION OF VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR
DAY VISITORS TO EAST BERLIN, REMOVAL OF THE BORDER
CONTROL POSTS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND THE
GDR, DISCONTINUATION OF THE VERORDNUNGSBLATT, AND THE
INSTITUTION ON MARCH 1 OF THE STREET USAGE TAX FOR
VISITORS WHO ENTER EAST BERLIN BY CAR. ALTHOUGH THIS
MOST RECENT MEASURE WOULD BRING IN SOME FIVE MILLION
MARKS IN REVENUE ANNUALLY, WISCHNEWSKI SAID HE WAS
CONVINCED THAT THE BASIC REASON FOR THE MEASURE WAS NOT
FINANCIAL BUT POLITICAL.

-- A NEW REGULATION WHICH REQUIRES THAT, AFTER
MAY 1, OIL BARGES WHICH DELIVER OIL PRODUCTS TO WEST
BERLIN MAY NOT RETURN EMPTY THROUGH EAST BERLIN UNTIL
THE RESIDUAL GAS HAD BEEN REMOVED. WISCHNEWSKI
SUGGESTED THAT THE MEASURE WAS INTENDED AS "PURE
CHICANERY" TOWARD WEST BERLIN; AS REPORTED SEPTTEL
(BONN 4330) HE INDICATED THAT IT HAD POTENTIALLY SERIOUS
CONSEQUENCES FOR BERLIN AND WAS BEING STUDIED AT A
HIGH LEVEL.

FRG CABINET DISCUSSIONS

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5. WISCHNEWSKI THEN TURNED TO THE MEETING WHICH THE
CHANCELLOR HELD ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 7 WITH KEY
OFFICIALS (DESCRIBED IN REF A). THE PURPOSE OF THE
MEETING, WISCHNEWSKI SAID, HAD BEEN TO CONSIDER OUT-
STANDING MATTERS OF INTEREST BOTH TO THE FRG AND TO THE

GDR WITH A VIEW TO TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT A PACKAGE WHICH GAUS MIGHT THEN NEGOTIATE WITH THE GDR. HE STRESSED THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN AS TO WHICH OF THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS THE FRG MIGHT EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO RAISE WITH THE GDR. THERE WOULD BE A MORE PRECISE STOCK-TAKING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND ANOTHER MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETING IN TWO WEEKS.

6. WISCHNEWSKI THEN ENUMERATED AND DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS ITEMS ON THE AGENDA:

-- TRANSIT PROBLEMS CONCERNING WEST BERLIN
DIRECTLY: A NORTHERN CROSSING POINT, THE DUCKBILL, THE TELTOW CANAL, SPANDAU LOCK, AND THE SOUTHERN RAILROAD PROPERTIES. ON ALL OF THESE PROJECTS THE GERMANS WOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ALLIES.

-- ASSURING BERLIN'S ENERGY SUPPLY. PLANS FOR ADDITIONAL POWER-GENERATING CAPACITY INSIDE WEST BERLIN HAD BEEN OBSTRUCTED ON ENVIRONMENTAL GROUNDS. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER TO RAISE WITH THE GDR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POWER LINE BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE FRG, AND IF SO, WITH WHAT SORTS OF GUARANTEES.

-- THE BERLIN-HAMBURG AUTOBAHN. THE FRG MUST SOON DECIDE ON WHETHER TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE 1975 TRANSIT AGREEMENTS WERE TO START IN 1978. THERE WERE STILL DECISIONS TO BE MADE ON WHAT ROUTE THE AUTOBAHN WOULD FOLLOW IN THE FRG, IN VIEW OF CONTINUING DISAGREEMENTS
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BETWEEN LOWER SAXONY AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

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-- RECONSTRUCTION OF THE BERLIN-HELMSTEDT
AUTOBAHN. THE QUALITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION NOW
UNDER WAY HAS NOT BEEN AS GOOD AS IT WAS SUPPOSED TO
BE, ACCORDING TO THE 1975 AGREEMENTS.

-- RAIL CONSTRUCTION WORK IN WEST BERLIN. WORK
ON REOPENING THE RAIL STOP AT STAACKEN HAD ALSO NOT
BEEN CARRIED OUT AS IT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN.

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7. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE TRAFFIC AND TRANSIT
RELATED PROJECTS, WISCHNEWSKI MENTIONED THESE ADDITIONAL
ITEMS IN WHICH THE FRG WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MAKING
PROGRESS:

-- TRANSFER OF NON-COMMERCIAL PAYMENTS.

-- INCREASE IN VISITS FROM EAST TO WEST.
WISCHNEWSKI DOUBTED THAT MUCH IMPROVEMENT WAS POSSIBLE
IN THIS AREA BUT COMMENTED THAT THE FRG MUST ALWAYS
MAKE THE EFFORT.

-- CULTURAL AGREEMENT. THE CHANCES FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ARE SLIGHT, BUT IT MUST BE DISCUSSED.

-- ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTIONS. A SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS, INCLUDING A COUPLE ON THE FRG/GDR "DEMARCATON LINE," WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION.

-- BORDER DEMARCATION. WISCHNEWSKI DOUBTED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ELBE QUESTION, AS THE FRG COULD MAKE NO CONCESSIONS HERE. BUT THE OTHER ISSUES BEFORE THE BORDER COMMISSION HAD BEEN RESOLVED, AND IF THE ELBE PROBLEM COULD BE TAKEN OUT OF THE PACKAGE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THE WORK OF THE BORDER COMMISSION WITH AN AGREEMENT.

-- POSTAL NEGOTIATIONS. WISCHNEWSKI SAID THERE WAS A LARGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT THE GDR WANTED THE FRG TO PAY AND WHAT THE FRG WAS PREPARED TO PAY. THE GDR WAS DEMANDING DM 155 MILLION ANNUALLY; THE FRG OFFER WAS MUCH LOWER. SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN SEVEN NEGOTIATING ROUNDS, WITHOUT SUCCESS.

8. WISCHNEWSKI CONCLUDED HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION BY CONFIDENTIAL

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STATING THAT THE FRG HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT, DESPITE ALL THE DIFFICULTIES, THE READINESS TO NEGOTIATE EXISTS ON THE GDR SIDE. WHILE THIS WAS NOT SO CLEAR FROM THE RECENT HONECKER INTERVIEW IN THE SAARBRUECKER ZEITUNG, THIS IMPRESSION DID COME THROUGH FROM "OTHER CONTACTS."

9. WISCHNEWSKI ALSO REPEATED THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE FRG. HE SAID THAT THE FRG WOULD ATTEMPT IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO ESTABLISH WHICH OF THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS AFFECTING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE GDR WERE SUSCEPTIBLE OF SOLUTION AND WHAT THE TOTAL COST WOULD BE FOR A COMBINED PACKAGE. GAUS WOULD THEN OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH A PACKAGE. MANY OF THE ISSUES WOULD BE ONES IN WHICH THE THREE ALLIES WERE INTERESTED, AND WISCHNEWSKI EXPRESSED FULL READINESS ON THE PART OF THE FRG TO CONSULT WITH THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS AFTER FURTHER INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE FRG SIDE.

MOTIVES FOR GDR ACTIONS

10. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION, WISCHNEWSKI RESPONDED TO A QUESTION FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON MOTIVES FOR THE RECENT MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GDR AND ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE SOVIETS WITH REGARD TO THESE MEASURES. WISCHNEWSKI SAID THAT IT WAS

QUITE CLEAR THAT THE GDR WAS INTERESTED IN REDUCING THE DESIRE ON THE PART OF ITS RESIDENTS TO EMIGRATE. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT HAD HEIGHTENED THAT DESIRE, AND THE GROWING NUMBER OF EMIGRATION APPLICATIONS GAVE EVIDENCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE CONCLUSION OF THE FRG WAS THAT THE GDR LEADERSHIP HAD THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.

11. AS FOR THE EXTENT OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO RECENT GDR ACTIONS, WISCHNEWSKI SAID HE HAD NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE AND THUS COULD ONLY GIVE A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT.
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IT SEEMED CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE GDR HAD ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE ABOLITION OF THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR THE ELECTION OF BERLINERS TO THE "SO-CALLED PARLIAMENT." WHILE THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY REFUSED TO GRANT THIS WISH, THEY DID MAKE CERTAIN OTHER CONCESSIONS TO THE GDR INSTEAD. SOME OF THE GDR MEASURES SHOULD, IN WISCHNEWSKI'S VIEW, BE VIEWED IN THAT LIGHT. IN ADDITION, HE SAID THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE THAT CERTAIN OF THE MEASURES -- E.G., REMOVAL OF THE CONTROL POSTS BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND THE GDR --

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HAD BEEN TAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTING THE SOVIETS. IN GENERAL, WISCHNEWSKI SAID, IT MUST ALWAYS BE ASSUMED THAT ON BERLIN MATTERS THE GDR IS THE PARTNER WHICH IS URGING CHANGE ON THE SOVIETS.

12. WISCHNEWSKI DIGRESSED AT THIS POINT TO NOTE THAT ON SOME ISSUES IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE GDR AND THE USSR TO REACH AGREEMENT VERY PROMPTLY. HE REFERRED IN THIS REGARD TO SEVERAL RECENT EXCHANGES OF PRISONERS. THERE HAD BEEN A VERY QUICK EXCHANGE OF TWO SOVIETS ARRESTED IN THE FRG FOR TWO GDR RESIDENTS (PRESUMABLY THE LATTER WERE ON THE LIST OF PERSONS IMPRISONED IN THE GDR WHOM THE FRG WAS INTERESTED IN "RANSOMING"). A WEST GERMAN WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN MOSCOW HAD ALSO BEEN VERY QUICKLY EXCHANGED FOR THREE EAST GERMANS WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN THE FRG AND TWO SOVIETS WHO WERE UNDER ARREST ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES.

INTER-ZONAL TRADE

13. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR MENTIONED INER-ZONAL TRADE AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A CONNECTION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND THE OTHER INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS WISCHNEWSKI HAD DISCUSSED. WISCHNEWSKI GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF NOT HAVING CONSIDERED THE MATTER BUT SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SPEAK MORE FULLY ON THE SUBJECT AT THE NEXT MEETING. HE MENTIONED THAT THE LEIPZIG FAIR WOULD BE OPENING SOON AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS ON COMMERCIAL MATTERS ON THAT OCCASION. MEANWHILE, HE COMMENTED THAT THE GDR HAD HAD A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SUCCESS IN ITS EFFORTS OVER THE PAST YEAR TO INCREASE ITS EXPORTS TO THE FRG, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION. WHILE EXPORTS TO THE GDR CONSTITUTED ONLY 1.5 PERCENT

OF FRG EXPORTS, GDR EXPORTS TO THE FRG REPRESENTED OVER
TEN PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS.
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HUMAN CONTACTS

14. WISCHNEWSKI INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD INTENDED
EARLIER TO COMMENT ON THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
HUMAN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE GDR. HE NOTED
THAT LAST YEAR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT MILLION WEST
BERLINERS AND FRG RESIDENTS HAD VISITED EAST BERLIN AND
THE GDR; ALTOGETHER THERE HAD BEEN 26 MILLION VISITS.
NINETY PERCENT OF THE WEST GERMANS WHO VISIT SPEAK
FREELY OF THEIR OPINION OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST STATE.
THIS SITUATION IS NOT WITHOUT ITS PROBLEMS FOR THE GDR.
THE FRG WISHES TO CONTINUE THIS HUMAN CONTACT BUT
STRIVES TO AVOID STRAINS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN SEVERE
RESTRICTIONS ON VISITS FROM THE WEST. ALSO IN THE
FIELD OF HUMAN RELATIONS, WISCHNEWSKI SAID THE
STATISTICS ON IMMIGRATION WERE OF INTEREST. SINCE THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, UNTIL DECEMBER 1976, THERE HAD BEEN
60,000 IMMIGRANTS INTO THE FRG -- A NUMBER WHICH HE
TERMED HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT. THE POLES HAD ACTED VERY
CORRECTLY ON EMIGRATION MATTERS SINCE SIGNATURE OF LAST
YEAR'S TREATIES AND THE NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS FROM THE
SOVIET UNION HAD INCREASED FROM OVER 5,000 TO OVER
9,000. ROMANIA WAS THE ONLY EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY
WHERE FAMILY REUNIFICATION HAD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT
SINCE HELSINKI.

GOVERNMENT/OPPOSITION RELATIONS

15. AMBASSADOR STOESSEL REFERRED TO THIS WEEK'S CDU
NATIONAL CONVENTION AND ASKED FOR WISCHNEWSKI'S VIEWS
ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A CONSENSUS ON BERLIN AND
INNER-GERMAN POLICY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
OPPOSITION. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE SPD COMMITTEE ON
THE VIABILITY OF BERLIN AND ASKED WHETHER THAT COMMITTEE
MIGHT BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE
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OPPOSITION PARTIES.

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16. IN RESPONSE, WISCHNEWSKI SAID AN OPPOSITION
REPRESENTING 48.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTERS OBVIOUSLY COULD
NOT BE IGNORED AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD DEVOTED
CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO KEEPING IT INFORMED OF ITS
BERLIN AND GERMANY POLICY. GAUS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD
RECENTLY MET WITH CDU CHAIRMAN KOHL. AS FOR THE
ATTITUDE OF THE CDU, WISCHNEWSKI SAID ITS CONGRESS HAD
DEVOTED AN ENTIRE DAY TO GERMAN POLICY AND THAT THE
RESULTS AS REFLECTED IN RESOLUTIONS AND MOST OF THE
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SPEECHES SHOWED NO CHANGE IN THE CDU OUTLOOK. NEVERTHELESS, HE EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM THAT THERE MIGHT BE GRADUAL CHANGE. SOME OF THE SPEAKERS AT THE CONVENTION HAD CALLED FOR A MORE ENLIGHTENED APPROACH, AND WISCHNEWSKI SAW THIS AS A HOPEFUL SIGN; THERE WAS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY OF AN EVENTUAL CONSENSUS ON BERLIN POLICY. PROBLEMS REMAINED, NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS SUCH THINGS AS ESTABLISHING ADDITIONAL FEDERAL OFFICES IN BERLIN AND THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FOUNDATION. (WISCHNEWSKI SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE LATTER WITH KOHL, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.)

SPD COMMISSION ON VIABILITY OF BERLIN

17. THE SPD COMMISSION ON BERLIN, WISCHNEWSKI SAID, WAS DISCUSSING NOT ONLY ECONOMIC BUT ALSO CULTURAL QUESTIONS: WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE THE CITY MORE INTERESTING, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND CULTURALLY, IN CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. HE RECALLED THAT DURING THE COLD WAR THERE HAD BEEN LARGE RALLIES AT SCHOENEBERG RATHAUS CALLING FOR FREEDOM AND THESE HAD GIVEN THE CITY A CERTAIN MOOD. SINCE THE QA, THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE -- NOT A NEGATIVE ONE, BUT NEVERTHELESS A CHANGE IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOOD. THE TASK BEFORE THE SPD COMMISSION WAS TO CONSIDER HOW TO MAKE LIFE IN BERLIN MORE ATTRACTIVE AND MORE LIVEABLE IN THIS CHANGED SITUATION. SO FAR IT HAD ONLY TALKED ABOUT ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, BUT IT WOULD BROADEN ITS SCOPE IN THE FUTURE.

18. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, WISCHNEWSKI SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE ONE OBSERVATION. REMARKS HAD BEEN HEARD IN THE CHANCELLERY, HE SAID, ABOUT THE BONN GROUP. HE WANTED TO REJECT THESE CATEGORICALLY AND TO ASSURE THE AMBASSADORS THAT BOTH THE CHANCELLOR AND THE CHANCELLERY HAD A VERY POSITIVE OPINION ABOUT CONFIDENTIAL

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THE WORK OF THE BONN GROUP. (HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE REFERENCE, AND ALL THREE AMBASSADORS WERE SOMEWHAT MYSTIFIED.)

19. COMMENT: WHAT CAME THROUGH MOST CLEARLY FROM WISCHNEWSKI'S REMARKS WAS THAT THE FRG IS DESIROUS OF GETTING ON WITH ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE GDR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT APPARENTLY TENDS TO VIEW THE VARIOUS RESTRICTIVE MEASURES TAKEN RECENTLY BY THE GDR AS NECESSARY ATTEMPTS TO KEEP THE LID ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION, PARTICULARLY THE GROWING DEMAND FOR PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE, AND THE

STEPS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO BERLIN AS AN ACQUIESCENCE BY
THE SOVIETS IN A FEW OF THE GDR DEMANDS WHICH
ARE ALWAYS ON THE TABLE. EFFORTS TO PULL TOGETHER A
NEGOTIATING PACKAGE INDICATE THAT THE FRG IS NOT IN A
MOOD FOR RETALIATION BUT RATHER BELIEVES THAT
CONTINUING TO ENGAGE THE GDR IN NEGOTIATIONS IS THE
BEST WAY TO KEEP RELATIONS ON AN EVEN KEEL.
WISCHNEWSKI'S EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN KEEPING THE
ALLIED AMBASSADORS INFORMED IS A GOOD BEGINNING AND
SUGGESTS THAT OUR INTERESTS WILL BE PROTECTED AS THE
PROCESS UNFOLDS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY PLEASED AT THE
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE
CHANCELLERY IN THESE CONSULTATIONS AND OVER THE FACT
THAT THE SENIOR FRG BONN GROUP REP (LUECKING) WAS
PRESENT.
STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, SUMMIT MEETINGS, STATUS OF BERLIN, BRIEFINGS, PROGRAMS (PROJECTS)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 11-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BONN04456
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770084-1052
Format: TEL
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770370/aaaacjvk.tel
Line Count: 672
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 0adf3dba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 13
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 USBERLIN 701, 77 BONN 3115
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3143084
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FRG CHANCELLERY BRIEFING ON BERLIN AND INNER- GERMAN RELATIONS
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, US, GC, GE, WB, FR, UK
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/0adf3dba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009